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Prosecuting Fatal Speech: What Minnesota’s State v. Final
Exit Network Means for Assisted-Suicide Laws Across the
Country
I. Introduction
“We hold that mentally competent adults who suffer from a terminal
illness . . . have a basic human right to choose to end their lives when they
judge their quality of life to be unacceptable.”1 This statement is the basic
mission of Final Exit Network, a right-to-die organization that advocates
the legalization of assisted suicide.2 Assisted suicide is among the most
controversial topics in the United States today. It is such a contentious issue
because it extends beyond politics, delving into matters of personal
autonomy and morality. Quite literally, it is a matter of life or death. The
United States Supreme Court has held that prohibiting assisted suicide does
not violate the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.3 As a result of those decisions, the debate has
shifted to the states. Currently, the vast majority of states make it illegal to
assist someone in committing suicide.4
The controversy surrounding this issue often focuses on due process
rights. This Note, however, will discuss the issue in a different context—
free speech. With physician-assisted suicide illegal in most states, right-todie groups have taken the initiative to help people suffering from terminal
illnesses by providing guidance on how to take their own life so that they
can achieve “death with dignity.”5 But the actions of these groups can
violate statutory prohibitions on assisting a suicide. And when these groups
do not actually provide physical assistance to the terminally ill, but instead
only give advice and information, then the right to free speech is
implicated.
State v. Final Exit Network, Inc.6 is a noteworthy Minnesota case from
recent years in which the issues of assisted suicide and free speech have
1. Our Guiding Principles, FINAL EXIT NETWORK, https://web.archive.org/web/
20180701120417/https://www.finalexitnetwork.org/Mission.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2019).
2. Id.
3. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793, 797 (1997).
4. State-by-State Guide to Physician-Assisted Suicide, PROCON.ORG (Feb. 21, 2017),
https://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132.
5. DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
6. 889 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 145 (2017).
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arisen. Final Exit Network was charged with violating Minnesota’s
prohibition on assisted suicide when it advised and informed someone on
how to kill herself. The organization did not provide any physical assistance
that enabled the victim to commit suicide.7 Nevertheless, the company’s
counseling on suicide qualified as assistance within the meaning of the
relevant Minnesota statute.8 Final Exit Network challenged the law as
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, arguing that it restricted
speech based on content.9
This Note will analyze State v. Final Exit Network. Part II provides a
background for previous cases from the United States Supreme Court and
the Minnesota Supreme Court that dealt with assisted suicide and free
speech. Part III describes the facts surrounding Final Exit Network and
analyzes the court’s reasoning. Part IV argues that the statute in question
may not violate the First Amendment, though the court’s interpretation of
“assisting” a suicide to include pure speech is questionable. The Note then
compares Minnesota’s ban on assisted suicide to other states’ statutes and
discusses the implications of the case on those statutes. In particular, it
examines Oklahoma’s prohibition on assisted suicide, which is especially
broad and therefore potentially problematic. After observing that many
other states avoid First Amendment issues by clearly defining “assisting” a
suicide to require physical assistance, it argues that state legislatures would
be wise not to define “assist” to include mere speech.
II. Law Before the Case
A. United States Supreme Court—Assisted Suicide
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on any cases involving
assisted suicide from a free-speech perspective, but it has examined the
issue of assisted suicide in different contexts. Most notably, in Washington
v. Glucksberg, the Court upheld a state law that prohibited aiding someone
in committing suicide.10 It held that the law did not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 The Court determined that there
was no fundamental liberty interest to commit suicide because American
and English society had a long history and tradition of opposition to

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 300.
Id. at 305.
Id.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Id. at 735.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss4/8

2019]

NOTES

1231

suicide.12 Since the liberty interest in question was not fundamental, the
statute simply needed to be rationally related to legitimate government
interests in order to be constitutional.13 This statute satisfied the standard
because it furthered the government’s interest in preserving human life,
protecting the integrity of the medical profession, protecting vulnerable
groups (e.g., the elderly or disabled) from abuse, and preventing an
expansion of the law to allow euthanasia.14
Similarly, in Vacco v. Quill, the Court held that prohibitions on assisted
suicide did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.15 The state statute in question did not implicate equal
protection because it did not draw any distinctions between classes of
people—no one was permitted to commit suicide.16 Therefore, the law was
constitutional because it furthered the legitimate government interests that
the Court had discussed in Glucksberg.17 Due to these decisions, many
states have made it a crime to aid a suicide.
B. United States Supreme Court—Free Speech
In respect to free speech, the United States Supreme Court has made
many decisions regarding content-based restrictions to speech (though none
in connection with assisted suicide). Based on these rulings, the states must
meet stringent requirements in order to prohibit pure speech due to
content.18 Under the First Amendment, any statute that regulates speech
based on content is presumptively invalid.19 Nevertheless, there are several
categories of speech to which the Court has not extended First Amendment
protection.20 These categories include obscenity,21 defamation,22 incitement
12. Id. at 728.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 728–33.
15. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
16. Id. at 800. The Court rejected the argument that there was a suspect classification
between terminally ill patients who were attached to life-support equipment and patients
who were not. Id. at 800–01. It reasoned that such a distinction was rational because merely
withdrawing life-support equipment brings about death by natural causes, but assisted
suicide kills the patient directly. Id.
17. Id. at 808–09.
18. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1988).
19. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
20. Id. at 382–83.
21. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792–93 (2011) (noting that obscenity includes only depictions of
sexual conduct, not “whatever a legislature finds shocking”).
22. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
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to imminent lawless action,23 speech integral to criminal conduct,24 and
fighting words.25 The Court generally has been unwilling to expand these
categories of unprotected speech to encompass new types of speech.26 Thus,
any content-based restriction that does not clearly fall into one of those
categories will most likely be presumptively invalid under the First
Amendment.
Even if the speech is not considered unprotected, a content-based
restriction may still be constitutional.27 But the standard is much higher, as
the statute must satisfy strict scrutiny.28 This standard requires that the
statute be narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.29
Although the government can sometimes demonstrate that its restriction on
speech advances a compelling interest, it is challenging to prove that the
statute is narrowly tailored. Two instances in which a statute is not
narrowly tailored are when it is overbroad or underinclusive. A statute is
overbroad when it extends beyond its original purpose to encompass many
types of ordinary, lawful speech.30 Overbroad restrictions apply to a
substantial number of areas beyond the legislature’s intention, which is why
they are unconstitutional on their face.31 Conversely, a statute is
underinclusive compared to its alleged purpose when it singles out certain
speech, while permitting other similar types of speech that offend the same
principles.32 When a statute is underinclusive, there are concerns about
whether the government truly intends to pursue its compelling interest.33
The Court has not hesitated to strike down laws as violating the First
Amendment for failing to be narrowly tailored, even though the
23. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969).
24. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
25. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
26. See, e.g., Brown, 564 U.S. at 792 (holding that the Court cannot create categories of
unprotected speech unless there is strong evidence that such speech has been historically
unprotected); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (refusing to characterize
depictions of animal cruelty as outside the protection of the First Amendment).
27. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
28. Id. at 230.
29. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992).
30. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473.
31. Id. A party may succeed in a facial challenge to a statute even if the statute is
constitutional as applied in that case. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973).
The opposite is also true: a statute that is constitutional on its face may be unconstitutional
when applied to a certain case. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S.
454, 477–78 (1995).
32. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011).
33. Id.
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government could show a compelling interest. In United States v. Stevens,
the Court ruled that a federal statute that banned the sale of depictions of
animal cruelty was facially unconstitutional.34 The primary purpose of the
statute was to ban the creation of “crush videos”—videos that showed
people crushing animals to death in order to cause sexual arousal in the
viewers.35 Despite the government’s interest in eliminating the
dissemination of these videos, the statute could also extend to lawful
depictions of hunting.36 The demand for hunting publications heavily
outweighed the demand for crush videos.37 Therefore, the statute was
overbroad, as it would encompass a substantial amount of speech that is
clearly protected under the First Amendment.38
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Court once again struck
down a content-based restriction on speech for not being narrowly tailored,
but this time because the statute was underinclusive.39 That case involved a
California statute that banned the sale of violent video games to minors.40
Although California had an interest in preventing harm to minors, its
manner of pursuing that interest raised doubts about its intentions.41 The
statute targeted only videogames, but had no impact on books, movies, and
TV shows, which could be just as violent and harmful to children as
videogames.42 Because the statute was underinclusive, it failed strict
scrutiny and was unconstitutional.43 The ramifications of these recent
decisions are that content-based restrictions on speech face a steep
challenge. Even if a statute furthers a compelling government interest, it
may still be unconstitutional if the legislature’s actions cover an amount of
speech that is too broad or not broad enough.
C. Minnesota Supreme Court—Assisted Suicide and Free Speech
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has examined whether a statutory ban on assisting a suicide violates the
right to free speech. The same statute from Final Exit Network was in

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

559 U.S. at 482.
Id. at 465–66.
Id. at 476.
Id.
Id.
564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011).
Id. at 789.
Id. at 802.
Id.
Id. at 805.
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dispute two years earlier in State v. Melchert-Dinkel.44 Minnesota’s statute
on aiding suicide provided: “[w]hoever intentionally advises, encourages,
or assists another in taking the other’s own life may be sentenced to
imprisonment . . . or to payment of a fine . . . .”45 The issue before the court
was whether the statute violated the First Amendment by punishing
someone for “assisting, advising, or encouraging another in committing
suicide.”46
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition on advising and
encouraging someone to commit suicide was unconstitutional under the
First Amendment, but that the ban on assisting a suicide was
constitutional.47 Speech that enabled someone to commit suicide did not fall
into an unprotected category of speech such as speech integral to criminal
conduct or incitement to imminent lawless action, as suicide was not a
crime in Minnesota.48 As a result, the statute was subject to strict scrutiny
because it restricted speech based on content.49 Under strict scrutiny,
content-based restrictions are constitutional only if the law (1) is necessary
to further a compelling government interest and (2) is narrowly tailored to
furthering that interest.50
The court determined that the state met the first requirement because it
had a “compelling interest in preserving human life.”51 But the “advising”
and “encouraging” parts of the statute were not narrowly tailored.52 Such
terms were broad and could encompass speech that generally supported
suicide.53 In contrast, the “assisting” provision was narrowly tailored.54 It
criminalized only acts and speech that targeted a specific individual and
directly caused him to commit suicide.55 Notably, the court interpreted the
word “assists” to include pure speech that enabled someone to commit
suicide, so that a physical act was unnecessary to “assist” a person in taking
his own life.56 The court then severed and excised the words “advises” and
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

844 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 2014).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (2016).
Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19–21.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 22–23.
Id.
Id. at 23.
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“encourages” from the statute, leaving the “assists” provision intact.57
Melchert-Dinkel had a significant impact on future cases. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals relied heavily on it when deciding Final Exit Network,
and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of “assists” was the basis
for prosecuting Final Exit Network.
III. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Final Exit Network (Final Exit) was a nonprofit company that provided
services to people who wished to end their life by committing suicide.58
Someone could become a member of Final Exit by paying an annual fee.59
Members who wanted to commit suicide would request exit services from
Final Exit.60 The company would then follow a certain procedure to aid that
member in committing suicide.61 This procedure included ensuring that the
member was mentally competent and suffering from an incurable condition,
conducting a telephone interview with the member, requiring the member
either to read a book or watch a movie regarding death by helium
asphyxiation, and providing the member with information about buying the
materials necessary for suicide by helium asphyxiation.62 Once these steps
were completed, Final Exit’s medical director determined whether to
provide the member with the company’s services, based on the member’s
medical condition.63 When a member was approved for exit services, the
company appointed an exit guide, who informed the member on where to
buy the necessary equipment and visited the member in person before the
suicide.64 On the day of the suicide, two guides from Final Exit were
present at the member’s home.65 They did not physically assist the member
in committing suicide, but they checked to ensure that the member was
dead and then removed the equipment.66

57. Id. at 24.
58. State v. Final Exit Network, Inc., 889 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 145 (2017).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 300.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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D.D. was a woman who had suffered from chronic pain for eleven
years.67 She eventually became a member of Final Exit and requested exit
services.68 The company followed its standard procedure with D.D. and
eventually approved her for exit services.69 The guide that Final Exit
appointed to D.D. and the company’s medical director traveled to D.D.’s
home in Minnesota for the suicide.70 D.D. set up all of the equipment for
helium asphyxiation by herself, before they arrived at her house.71 Neither
the guide nor the medical director physically aided D.D. in preparing the
necessary equipment or committing suicide, as was consistent with Final
Exit’s normal procedures.72 Nevertheless, if D.D. had made a mistake in
setting up the equipment, they would have told her how to fix it so that the
equipment was set up properly.73 D.D. then committed suicide by way of
helium asphyxiation.74 The medical director checked D.D.’s pulse to make
sure that she was dead, and then he and the guide disposed of the
equipment.75 D.D.’s husband found D.D. several hours later.76
Although there was no criminal investigation of D.D.’s death
immediately, Final Exit’s role in her death came to light a few years later as
part of an investigation from the Georgia Bureau of Investigations (GBI). 77
GBI gave evidence regarding D.D.’s death to the Minnesota Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension, which conducted its own investigation.78
Following this investigation, a grand jury indicted Final Exit for violating
Minnesota’s assisted-suicide law, which provided: “[w]hoever intentionally
advises, encourages, or assists another in taking the other’s own life may be
sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a
fine of not more than $30,000, or both.”79 Since the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Melchert-Dinkel had severed the “advises” and “encourages” part
of the statute, Final Exit faced charges only on the “assists” provision.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 300–01.
71. Id. at 301.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Final Exit is incorporated in Georgia, which is why the GBI investigated its
business activities. Id. at 299, 301.
78. Id. at 301.
79. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.215, subdiv. 1 (2016)).
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B. Issue
At the trial, the district court instructed the jury that “assists” meant that
the defendant “enabled [D.D.] through either physical conduct or words that
were specifically directed at [D.D.] and that the conduct or words enabled
[D.D.] to take her own life.”80 This jury instruction was different than Final
Exit’s proposed jury instruction.81 That instruction defined “assists” as
providing “tangible physical assistance in the suicide.”82 Under the
proposed instruction, merely advising and teaching someone about suicide
methods would not qualify as assisting a suicide.83 The district court denied
Final Exit’s motion for a rehearing on the jury instructions regarding the
definition of “assists.”84 The jury found Final Exit guilty of assisting
another in taking their own life.85 Since the jury instructions defined
“assists” so as to include words alone, Final Exit was found guilty because
it gave D.D. instructions and advice on how to commit suicide.86 Final Exit
appealed, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and as
applied to this case under the First Amendment.87 It alleged that the statute
amounted to content discrimination in violation of the First Amendment by
criminalizing mere speech that advised someone on committing suicide.88
C. Decision
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota began by explaining the standard of
review for First Amendment cases.89 Because the statute allowed for
prosecution of people based solely on what they have said, the restriction
was based on content.90 Accordingly, the statute was subject to strict
scrutiny, which meant that it had to be justified by a compelling
government interest and be narrowly tailored to furthering that interest—in
other words, neither underinclusive nor overinclusive.91

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 302.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 302–03.
Id.
Id. at 303.
Id.
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The court first held that the statute was not unconstitutional on its face.92
It based this holding on precedent from Melchert-Dinkel.93 In that case, the
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the statute survived strict scrutiny
because the government had a compelling interest in preserving human
life.94 The statute was narrowly tailored to furthering that interest because it
included only speech that was directly targeted at a specific individual, not
broad public speech that promoted assisted suicide.95 Since the court of
appeals was bound by the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court, the
statute, on its face, withstood First Amendment strict scrutiny.96
The court then held that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to
Final Exit in this case.97 It rejected Final Exit’s argument that the jury
instructions were unconstitutionally overbroad.98 Once again, the court of
appeals relied on precedent from Melchert-Dinkel in making its decision.
Melchert-Dinkel had interpreted “assists” within the statute to include
speech that directly enabled a specific person to commit suicide.99
Therefore, the jury instruction that the district court adopted in this case—
that “assists” meant words Final Exit specifically directed at D.D. and
enabled her to take her own life—was consistent with precedent.100 In
contrast, Final Exit’s proposed jury instruction clearly contradicted the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute.101 As such, the
district court’s jury instructions were not unconstitutionally overbroad, but
instead were consistent with the established law.102
In upholding the constitutionality of the statute as applied to this case,
the court expanded upon the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Melchert-Dinkel.103 It reiterated that the statute satisfied the first part of
strict scrutiny because the state has a compelling interest in preserving
human life.104 It also rejected Final Exit’s assertion that the government had
no compelling interest in forcing terminally ill individuals to continue their
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 22–23.
Final Exit, 889 N.W.2d at 303.
Id.
Id. at 304.
844 N.W.2d at 23.
Final Exit, 889 N.W.2d at 304.
Id. at 305.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 305–06.
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suffering.105 The fact that D.D. suffered from a terminal illness was
irrelevant; the state still had a compelling interest in preventing D.D. from
taking her own life.106
Furthermore, the statute in question met the second part of strict scrutiny
because it was narrowly tailored to furthering the government’s interest in
protecting human life.107 Final Exit argued that the statute was
underinclusive because it singled out certain types of speech, but did not
prohibit other speech that provided information about suicide.108
Specifically, the statute criminalized only speech that was directed at a
particular individual.109 In contrast, books or internet articles that provided
the same information about how to commit suicide did not fall under the
scope of the statute.110 But the court disagreed with Final Exit.111 The
statute’s limit to speech that directly targeted a specific individual did not
mean that the statute was underinclusive; rather, it meant that the statute
was narrowly tailored.112 Under the statute, Final Exit could still advocate
for the right to die and provide emotional support to its members.113 There
remained many ways in which the company could disseminate its
message.114 The only speech of Final Exit that the statute restricted was the
advice and instructions that it gave to D.D. specifically regarding how she
could commit suicide.115 Applied to the facts of this case, “the statute
burdened no more speech than necessary to further the state’s compelling
interest in preserving D.D.’s life.”116 As such, it was narrowly tailored:
“[n]o less restrictive alternative would have served the state’s interest in
protecting D.D.’s life.”117 Because it was narrowly tailored to further a
compelling government interest, the statute survived strict scrutiny.118 Even

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 306.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 306–07.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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though it placed a content-based restriction on free speech, it was still
constitutional under the First Amendment.119
IV. Analysis
A. Consistency with Precedent
Generally, the decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals is consistent
with current First Amendment jurisprudence, as the statute meets the
requirements of strict scruti*ny for content-based restrictions. Preserving
human life and preventing suicide are compelling government interests. In
previous assisted-suicide cases, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized these interests as legitimate.120 Although the Court has not
explicitly stated that preserving human life reaches the level of a
compelling interest, the Court would likely find it compelling because of its
long history and tradition.121 Within the context of assisted suicide, another
similar interest that the Court has recognized, and may find compelling, is
protecting the physically handicapped from abuse.122 But proving that the
119. Id. at 307–08.
120. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
121. Despite recognizing a constitutional right to abortion, the Court has suggested that
there is a compelling interest in preserving life in multiple cases involving abortion. See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (noting that “the
State has a substantial interest in potential life”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)
(determining that the government’s interest in preserving life becomes compelling after
viability of the fetus). In respect to the issue of refusing medical treatment, the Court has
allowed states to “assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be
weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual.” Cruzan by Cruzan
v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (upholding the requirement of clear
and convincing evidence of the patient’s intent before terminating life-sustaining treatment
for the patient in a vegetative state).
122. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731–32 (1997) (“The State’s interest
here goes beyond protecting the vulnerable from coercion; it extends to protecting disabled
and terminally ill people from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and ‘societal
indifference.’”). Opponents of assisted suicide are especially concerned that assisted suicide
promotes the idea that it is better to commit suicide than to live with a disability. See, e.g.,
Diane Coleman, Why Do Disability Rights Organizations Oppose Assisted Suicide Laws?,
NOT DEAD YET, https://notdeadyet.org/why-do-disability-rights-organizations-opposeassisted-suicide-laws (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“For [doctors who perform assisted
suicides], it apparently goes without saying that disability is a fate worse than death.”);
Marilyn Golden, Why Assisted Suicide Must Not Be Legalized, DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUC. &
DEF. FUND, https://web.archive.org/web/20171021045257/https://dredf.org/assisted_suicide/
assistedsuicide.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (observing that in many countries and states
where assisted suicide is legal, people who commit suicide do so because of the belief that
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statute is narrowly tailored is more challenging. The Court has had no issue
with striking down content-based restrictions that are not narrowly tailored,
no matter how compelling an interest the government has in such
restrictions. Here, the Minnesota court interpreted the statute so that it
applies only to speech that targets a specific person and directly causes that
person to commit suicide. Based on that interpretation, the statute would
probably be narrowly tailored. It would not extend to people that simply
advocate for the right to die, nor to media that describe how to commit
suicide, as those situations do not satisfy the requirement that the speech be
targeted at a certain person. Thus, there is a strong argument that the
Minnesota court’s decision is consistent with First Amendment law.
Nevertheless, the most significant issue with this case is the court’s
reliance on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of “assists”
within the meaning of the statute. Based on the plain meaning of the word,
it is not clear that “assists” would include mere speech without physical
assistance.123 There is nothing within the statute that suggests that the
legislature intended for the word to be defined in such a manner.
Furthermore, the court interpreted “assists” to include only speech that was
directly targeted at a particular individual, and not books or other media
that explained how to commit suicide. Though such an interpretation makes
the statute narrowly tailored, such a distinction between types of speech is
not apparent from the text of the statute or from the plain meaning of the
word. If “assists” includes pure speech, then it is not clear why speech that
is not targeted to a specific individual (which could easily “assist” someone

there is no dignity in being disabled); William Peace, The New York Times and Assisted
Suicide, BAD CRIPPLE (Aug. 16, 2017, 3:24 PM), https://badcripple.blogspot.com/2017/08/
the-new-york-times-and-assisted-suicide.html (“Replace the condition ALS with any other
neurological calamity as a means of justifying death with dignity. This indicates just how
deeply ableism is entrenched into the fabric of society. Alzheimer’s is a fate worse than
death. Quadriplegia is a fate worse than death. Multiple Sclerosis is a fate worse than death.
Muscular Dystrophy is a fate worse than death. Parkinson’s disease is a fate worse than
death.”) (responding to a New York Times author who stated that ALS would be a fate worse
than death for her mother).
123. This was a central argument of Justice Page’s dissenting opinion in MelchertDinkel. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 26 (Minn. 2014) (Page, J., dissenting)
(“The [New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary] defines ‘assist’ as ‘[a]n act of helping’ and
to help ‘a person in necessity; an action, process, or result.’ . . . Thus, the word ‘assists’ . . .
requires an action more concrete than speech instructing another on suicide methods. . . . My
interpretation is not only consistent with the dictionary definition of ‘assist,’ it does not
render the word ‘assists’ superfluous or criminalize the publication of books that simply
describe successful suicidal behavior.” (citation omitted)).
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based on the common meaning of the word) would not fall within the
parameters of the statute.
As such, by interpreting “assists” to include pure speech in MelchertDinkel, the Minnesota Supreme Court took a risk that the statute would
later be struck down under the First Amendment. State courts sometimes
interpret statutes in a manner that departs from the plain text in order to
make them consistent with the Constitution.124 But in Melchert-Dinkel,
rather than avoiding constitutional questions, the court actually created
more problems by implicating free speech. Under an assisted-suicide statute
that regulates only conduct (i.e., physical assistance of a suicide), there is
no risk that the statute violates the First Amendment. But a statute that
encompasses speech could be struck down as unconstitutional, if the issue
were to reach the United States Supreme Court.125 The statute may still be
constitutional. The requirements that the Minnesota Supreme Court
established in Melchert-Dinkel—that the speech be targeted at a specific
individual and that there be a direct, causal link between the speech and the
suicide—may be sufficient to meet the rigorous standard that content-based
restrictions must satisfy. But there is no guarantee as to how the Court
would rule on the issue. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the assisted-suicide statute creates the possibility that the law will be ruled
unconstitutional, when an alternative interpretation that requires physical

124. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court narrowly interpreted a constitutionally
suspect ordinance in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In that case, the St. Paul
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance made it a misdemeanor to display a symbol or object (e.g.,
a burning cross) that “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others” on the basis of certain
protected characteristics such as race, gender, and religion. Id. at 380. The Minnesota
Supreme Court interpreted the statute to prohibit only fighting words—“conduct that itself
inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate violence.” In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d
507, 510 (Minn. 1991) (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). It
therefore upheld the ordinance on the basis that fighting words are categorically unprotected
under the First Amendment. Id. at 511. This interpretation was an attempt to save the
ordinance from a First Amendment challenge, as the court itself recognized that the
ordinance “should have been more carefully drafted.” Id. The United States Supreme Court
was then bound by the Minnesota court’s construction that the statute was limited to fighting
words. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381. Despite the Minnesota Supreme Court’s attempts to save the
ordinance, the United States Supreme Court nevertheless found it unconstitutional as
content-based discrimination. Id. at 391.
125. Since the Court denied certiorari in Final Exit Network, 138 S. Ct. 145 (2017),
Minnesota’s statute will remain for now. Nevertheless, the matter may come before the
Court in the future, depending on how strictly prosecutors in Minnesota choose to enforce
the law.
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assistance would have avoided questions regarding the constitutionality of
the law.
B. Comparisons to Other State Laws
As a state criminal case, State v. Final Exit Network, Inc. has no
precedential impact on other states. However, it raises important questions
about assisted-suicide laws that other states should consider. The majority
of states have some sort of prohibition on assisting another person in
committing suicide.126 No statutory ban on assisting a suicide explicitly
declares that speech alone is sufficient to violate the law. Furthermore,
unlike Minnesota, no other state courts have interpreted the word “assists”
within their statutes to include pure speech. And in many states, assistedsuicide laws have not been challenged based on free speech.127 But such
challenges may arise eventually, and Final Exit, along with MelchertDinkel, provides insight on this issue that will likely affect other states in
the future.
1. Oklahoma Law
Oklahoma’s ban on assisted suicide presents significant questions
regarding its constitutionality due to its similarity to Minnesota’s statute
prior to the Melchert-Dinkel decision. Oklahoma’s criminal statute
regarding assisted suicide provides: “[a]ny person guilty of aiding suicide
shall be guilty of a felony.”128 A person is guilty of aiding suicide when he
“willfully, in any manner, advises, encourages, abets, or assists another
person in taking his own life.”129 This statute contains the same words,
“advises” and “encourages,” that were severed from Minnesota’s assistedsuicide statute in Melchert-Dinkel. Additionally, the phrase “in any
manner” is even broader than the Minnesota statute. Due to its vagueness,
the phrase could easily encompass pure speech. Merely publishing books
126. States with Legal Physician-Assisted Suicide, PROCON.ORG, https://euthanasia.
procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132 (last visited Dec.16, 2018).
127. Usually, any challenges to assisted-suicide statutes are based on due process and
ideas of privacy and personal autonomy. Although Glucksberg clarified that such statutes do
not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, some state courts have
heard—and rejected—arguments that the statutes violate certain provisions of the state
constitution. See Morris v. Brandenburg, 376 P.3d 836 (N.M. 2016) (holding that prohibition
on physician-assisted suicide does not violate the due process clause of the New Mexico
Constitution); Krischer v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997) (holding that prohibition on
assisted suicide does not violate the privacy clause of the Florida Constitution).
128. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 817 (2011).
129. Id. § 813.
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and articles that promote the legalization of assisted suicide might violate
the statute, in that such action “encourages” suicide “in any manner.” So
far, Oklahoma has not faced any constitutional challenges to the statute. But
if such a case should arise, the phrase “in any manner,” along with the
prohibition on encouraging and advising a suicide, presents a high risk that
the statute would be struck down on its face for overbreadth.
Nevertheless, the “assists” provision would probably withstand any
facial constitutional challenges. The Minnesota Supreme Court left the
“assists” provision intact when it severed the words “advises” and
“encourages” from the statute in Melchert-Dinkel. A similar result could
occur in Oklahoma: assisting a suicide could still remain illegal even if the
criminalization of advising or encouraging a suicide were struck down. And
Oklahoma is less likely to confront First Amendment challenges to the
“assists” part of its statute. Although the criminal statute does not define the
term “assists,” Oklahoma has a civil statute, called the Assisted Suicide
Prevention Act, which does define the term.130 To violate the Assisted
Suicide Prevention Act, a person must, with the purpose of assisting
another in committing suicide, either (1) provide the “physical means by
which another person commits or attempts to commit suicide”; or (2)
participate in “a physical act by which another person commits or attempts
to commit suicide.”131 As a civil statute, the Assisted Suicide Prevention
Act does not impose criminal penalties on those who violate it. Instead, it
allows individuals to bring an action for damages or injunctive relief.132 It
also provides that licensed health care professionals who violate the Act
will have their licenses revoked.133
Due to the existence of the Assisted Suicide Prevention Act and its
requirement of a physical act in order to assist a suicide, a court would most
likely interpret the criminal statute in a similar manner. Therefore, the
“assists” provision of the statute will probably not encounter a First
Amendment challenge. It would be unwise for the state to prosecute
someone for “assisting” a suicide through speech alone when the Assisted
Suicide Prevention Act indicates that assistance requires a physical act. If
the state were to prosecute someone under such circumstances, the court
could resolve the issue through statutory interpretation—thus avoiding the
issue of the statute’s constitutionality.

130.
131.
132.
133.

63 OKLA. STAT. § 3141.1 (2011).
Id. § 3141.3.
Id. § 3141.5–6.
Id. § 3141.8.
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Though no case has yet arisen, there is a strong risk that Oklahoma’s ban
on aiding a suicide could be struck down, in whole or in part, if someone
brought a First Amendment challenge against it. There are several courses
of action that the state could take so as to prevent the law from being ruled
unconstitutional. First, prosecutors could choose only to charge individuals
with assisting a suicide, rather than advising or encouraging one. Also, they
could do so only when the individuals physically assisted the suicide. In
those instances, the defendants would not be able to use the First
Amendment as a defense, because no speech would be involved. Of course,
this option relies on the discretion of prosecutors and the idea that they will
be wise in their decision-making.
A second method of remedying the situation is to amend the statute. The
legislature could remove the “advises” and “encourages” provisions so that
the statute no longer covers pure speech. Moreover, eliminating the phrase
“in any manner” would be essential to maintaining the constitutionality of
the law. Even if the amended statute prohibited only assisting a suicide, “in
any manner” is vague enough that a court could interpret “assisting” as
including pure speech. The presence of that phrase makes it more likely that
the statute would be overbroad and therefore facially unconstitutional. The
legislature could also clarify the definition of “assists” so that it requires
physical assistance. Even if the legislature did not define “assists” within
the criminal statute, the courts could avoid free speech concerns by
interpreting the word in that same manner.
Of course, it is possible that the Oklahoma legislators would want the
assisted-suicide ban to cover more than physical assistance. They may wish
to prevent groups like Final Exit Network from evading assisted-suicide
laws by merely providing verbal advice to individuals who wish to end their
lives. A law criminalizing pure speech that assists a suicide might be able to
withstand strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. However, such an
interpretation of the word “assists” should not come from the courts.
Instead, the legislature should make that decision. Since the United States
Supreme Court has indicated that there may be a compelling interest in
preserving human life, a statute that restricts speech based on content must
be narrowly tailored. In order to survive a First Amendment challenge, the
statute would specifically need to provide how someone “assists” a suicide
through speech alone. For example, it could require that the speech be
directed at a certain person and that it directly cause that person to commit
suicide—similar to how the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted “assists”
in Melchert-Dinkel. There is no guarantee that the United States Supreme
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Court would uphold this statute, but it would only be possible if the statute
were narrow and specific.
2. Other States
For most states that criminalize assisting a suicide, there will be no First
Amendment problems. There are a few states other than Oklahoma that also
prohibit encouraging or advising a suicide “in any manner.”134 But many
states are not so broad as to criminalize anything other than assisting a
suicide. Also, the statutes often clearly indicate that “assists” means
physical assistance. For example, Georgia’s statute against assisting a
suicide defines “assists” as “the act of physically helping or physically
providing the means.”135 Other states that require a physical act include
Idaho,136 Illinois,137 Indiana,138 Kansas,139 Kentucky,140 Maryland,141
Ohio,142 Rhode Island,143 and South Carolina.144 By specifically defining
“assists” so as not to include speech alone, these states will probably not
face any legal challenges to the law, at least not based on the First
Amendment.
Not every state has explicitly indicated that assisting a suicide must
include a physical act. Some statutes simply use the word “assist” without
actually defining it.145 For most of these states, no cases have emerged that
examine the statute in the context of free speech. Whether any such cases
arise will depend on whether prosecutors in those states choose to charge
someone under the statute simply for pure speech that enables another
134. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37
(2017).
135. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (2017). The statute had previously made it illegal to
advertise or offer to assist another person in committing suicide, but the Supreme Court of
Georgia struck down that provision as violating the First Amendment. Final Exit Network v.
State, 722 S.E.2d 722, 723 (Ga. 2012).
136. IDAHO CODE § 18-4017 (2018).
137. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-34.5(a)(2) (2016).
138. IND. CODE § 35-42-1-2.5(b) (2018).
139. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5407(a)(2) (2014).
140. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302(2) (West 2015).
141. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-102 (West 2012).
142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3795.04 (West, Westlaw through 2017 State Issue 1).
143. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-60-3 (2006).
144. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1090(B)(2) (2016).
145. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.023 (2016);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 2016); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (2003) (defining
“assisting suicide” as “aiding another in the taking of his own life,” without further defining
“aiding”).
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person to commit suicide. If that should happen, the outcome may hinge on
the court’s interpretation of the word “assists,” without delving into any
First Amendment concerns.
V. Conclusion
Assisted suicide will likely remain a contested issue within the states for
quite some time. Although it may be constitutional to criminalize mere
speech that enables a suicide (as long as the statute is sufficiently worded so
that it is narrowly tailored), doing so creates the risk that the entire statute
will be struck down under the First Amendment. Many states have
criminalized assisting a suicide, but they have established that someone can
violate the law only by physically assisting a suicide. Such a decision by the
legislature is wise, as it avoids murky issues regarding free speech that
Minnesota courts have faced in recent years.
Anthony W. Joyce
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